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Abstract
I provide a compact reformulation of Carnap’s conditions of adequacy
for the analytic and the synthetic component of a theory and show that,
contrary to arguments by Winnie and Demopoulos, the conditions need
not be supplemented. Specifically, the axiomatization and the observa-
tional vocabulary of a theory determine its synthetic component uniquely
but leave some freedom in the choice of its analytic component. This
throws a new light on the process of the rational reconstruction of the-
ories and renders adequate a suggestion by Bedard for the interpretation
of theoretical terms (when expressed within the confines of standard
predicate logic). I suggest a possible analytic component for theories that is
stronger than the Carnap sentence and thus closer to Bedard’s suggestion.
Keywords: analyticity; analytic-synthetic distinction; Carnap sentence;
Ramsey sentence; reduction sentence; Przełe˛cki reduction pair; relativiza-
tion sentence
1 Introduction
The notion of analyticity is a difficult beast in natural language, too unclear to
do serious philosophical work according to some (Quine 1951). In spite of critics
(Quine 1951, again) this problem may be solved by explicating the notion (Mates
1951, 532–33). Such an explication is unlikely to succeed for all domains of appli-
cation at once (Martin 1952, 42–45), and it is the restriction to theories that can
be phrased in higher order predicate logic that has led to the probably most satis-
fying and influential explication. This explication, given by Carnap (1963, 24.d),
has been used for a variety of analyses, from metaphysics (Lewis 2009, §3) and
philosophy of science (Przełe˛cki 1980) to philosophical methodology (Papineau
2009, §iii).
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Besides his explication, Carnap also suggests three conditions of adequacy
that his explication meets and which I will simplify in the following (§2). Win-
nie proposes (and Demopoulos endorses) an additional condition of adequacy
that singles out Carnap’s explication as the uniquely adequate one for all possi-
ble theories (§3). I will show that it leads to implausible restrictions on analytic
sentences and theoretical terms. So Winnie’s condition should be given up, also
because it lacks a convincing argument in its support: Winnie’s argument rests on
a false analogy (§4), and Demopoulos’s argument for the need for an additional
condition of adequacy rests on an unjustified assumption about the rational re-
construction of theories (§5). Without an additional condition of adequacy, there
is a certain leeway in determining the analytic component of a theory, of which
I take advantage when developing a generalization of Carnap’s explication that is
more constructive in the case of empirically inadequate theories and that comes
closer to an informal suggestion by Bedard (§6).
2 Conditions of Adequacy for an Analytic-Synthetic Dis-
tinction
The starting point of my discussion is not that of a typical explication. Instead of
beginning with a vague explicandum given in normal language and searching for
a precise explicans that should be used instead, I will analyze the properties of
an extant explicans, namely Carnap’s. (My discussion is not meant as a historical
interpretation of Carnap’s writings, although I will at times comment on the
relation between Carnap’s positions and my results.)
Since Carnap’s explicans assumes higher order predicate logic, which is not
a formalism in which theories are typically phrased, most theories will have to
be axiomatized before the explicans can be applied. Carnap also assumes a bipar-
tition of the language’s vocabulary into a set O of observational terms and a set
T of theoretical terms.1 With this bipartition comes a tripartition of the set of
sentences of the language into observational sentences, whose only terms are ob-
servational, theoretical sentences containing only theoretical terms, and mixed
sentences containing both observational and theoretical terms. As Suppe (1971,
§i) has argued, the bipartition of the vocabulary crucially rests on the assump-
tion of an artificial language, since it cannot be found in natural languages (see
also Demopoulos 2008, 365). The exact nature of the bipartition is contentious,
and I will restrict my comments to the implications of Carnap’s explicans; histor-
ically, Carnap assumed the bipartition to be a result of language choice (Oberdan
1990).
With these assumptions, Carnap aims at finding a way of separating the
factual, synthetic content of a theory ϑ from its non-factual, analytic content,
which he takes to be conventional (cf. Demopoulos 2008, 364–65). Carnap (1963,
1. As is usual in this debate, ‘term’ is used as a synonym of ‘non-logical symbol’ in the follow-
ing.
2
Sebastian Lutz Choosing the Analytic Component of Theories—Preprint
24.D) suggests a general solution for cases in which the theory can be expressed
in a single sentence, so that there are only finitely many observational terms
O = {O1, . . . ,Om} and theoretical terms T = {T1, . . . ,Tn}, and ϑ can be written
as ϑ(O1, . . . ,Om ,T1, . . . ,Tn).2 Then, according to Carnap, an adequate synthetic
component of ϑ is its Ramsey sentence
RO (ϑ) := ∃X1 . . .Xnϑ
 
O1, . . . ,Om ,X1, . . . ,Xn

, 3 (1)
which results from ϑ by existentially generalizing on all theoretical terms in ϑ.
As an adequate analytic component of ϑ, he suggests its Carnap sentence
CO (ϑ) := RO (ϑ)→ ϑ . (2)
Because the Ramsey sentence does not contain any theoretical terms, it cannot
determine their meaning. And since the Carnap sentence contains the Ramsey
sentence as its antecedent, the theoretical terms are only given meaning if the
Ramsey sentence is true. If the Ramsey sentence is false, the Carnap sentence is al-
ways true, no matter the interpretation of the theoretical terms. (Since ¬RO (ϑ) is
an observation sentence, this means that on Carnap’s account analytic sentences
can be empirically verified.)
According to Carnap, RO (ϑ) and CO (ϑ) provide an adequate synthetic and,
respectively, analytic component of ϑ. To develop explicit conditions of ade-
quacy, Carnap (1963, 963) defines the observational content of any sentence S as
follows:
Definition 1. “The observational content or O-content of S =Df the class of all
non-L-true [not logically true] sentences in L′O which are implied by S.”
L′O refers to the “logically extended observation language”, whose sentences
contain only observational terms, logical symbols, and variables of any order
(959). In my terminology, the sentences of L′O are the observational sentences.
On the basis of definition 1, Carnap (1963, 963) suggests
Definition 2. “S ′ is O-equivalent (observationally equivalent) to S =Df S ′ is a
sentence in L′O and S ′ has the same O-content as S.”4
Finally, Carnap’s discussion (965) suggests the following conditions of ade-
quacy:5
2. To be more precise, one could write ϑ∗(O1, . . . ,Om ,T1, . . . ,Tn) = ϑ, so that ϑ∗ is an m+ n-
place formula of higher order and ϑ one of its instantiations. The notation used here has become
standard, however, and is less cumbersome.
3. The subscript stands for the vocabulary that remains after the existential generalization.
4. Note that Carnap’s definition is asymmetric: S ′ but not S has to be in L′O .
5. Contrary to definition 3 and the assumption of Winnie (1970) and Demopoulos (2008),
Carnap only intended the conditions in definition 3 to be sufficient (see appendix B). This does
not change the results of my discussion, however, since I want to elucidate the implications of
treating the conditions as also necessary.
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Definition 3. σ is an adequate synthetic component and α an adequate analytic
component of ϑ if and only if
“(a) The two components together are L-equivalent [logically equivalent] to
TC [:= ϑ ].
(b) The first component is O-equivalent to TC .
(c) The second component contains theoretical terms; but its O-content is
null, since its Ramsey-sentence is L-true [logically true] in L′O .”
Like Ramsey and Carnap sentences, these conditions of adequacy are defined
for single theories. Of course, they can be applied to multiple theories and ad-
ditional statements by conjoining the theories and statements. Since ‘O-content’
is defined relative to the extended observation language, the observational con-
tent of a theory is equivalent to its Ramsey sentence (appendix A, corollary 14),
which leads immediately to
Claim 1. σ is an adequate synthetic component of ϑ and α is an adequate analytic
component of ϑ if and only if
1. σ ∧α ϑ,
2. RO (σ) RO (ϑ),
3. σ contains no theoretical terms, and
4.  RO (α).
Claim 1 straightforwardly leads to
Corollary 2. RO (ϑ) is an adequate synthetic component of ϑ and CO (ϑ) is an
adequate analytic component.
The conditions of adequacy are themselves adequate only under a number of
presumptions. For one, there can be no analytic observational sentence besides
logical truths. For if there were such a sentenceω, RO (ω) ω would be analytic
without being a logical truth, contrary to condition 4. Therefore every observa-
tional sentence must be synthetic, which in turn suggests that the observational
terms of the language must be completely precise. Otherwise, a theory’s Ramsey
sentence may be not logically true but still analytic, because it might only make
some vague concepts more precise. For instance, an observational term O may
be vague so that an object named by the observational term c may or may not
be O. If ω Oc , then RO (ω) Oc , but by assumption, Oc is an analytic stip-
ulation about the extension of O. Thus observational terms are empirically and
precisely interpreted, and it is a matter of empirical fact whether observational
sentences are true (excepting logical truths, of course).
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The conditions of adequacy further presume higher order predicate logic.
Thus, although Carnap (1934, §17) considered logic conventional, its convention-
ality is not captured in the conditions of adequacy. In other words, the meaning
of the logical symbols is treated as having been chosen beforehand. The meaning
of mathematical terms, on the other hand, is not presumed to have been fixed.
For even though higher order logic arguably suffices for defining or at least ax-
iomatizing all concepts of mathematics, the definitions or axioms introduce new
terms (namely the mathematical ones), and these have to be either observational
or theoretical.6 If mathematical terms were observational, however, mathemati-
cal sentences would not be analytic, and thus mathematical terms are theoretical
terms.
Finally, the conditions of adequacy presume that an empirical theory plays a
significant role in determining the meaning of its theoretical terms, since it has
to entail the analytic sentences which give them meaning. Thus the proponent of
an empirical theory ϑ develops ϑ to account for observation sentences, but to do
so, has to engage in language choice (cf. Carnap 1966, 188). The Carnap sentence
hence expresses the idea that our concepts are not somehow a priori given to
us, but rather chosen as conventions in response to empirical information, and
indeed useless if that information turns out false: If the Ramsey sentence is false,
the theoretical terms are completely unrestricted in their interpretation.
Williamson (2007, 54) states that if analytic truths are true by convention
(“stipulation”), then the “distinction between analytic truth and synthetic truth
[ . . . ] distinguish[es] different senses of ‘true’”. He then argues that this is prob-
lematic because analytic and synthetic truths are not truth-functional, so that
from “the perspective of compositional semantics, the analytic-synthetic distinc-
tion is no distinction between different ways of being true” (58). One response
to his argument is that according to the Carnap sentence analyticity is not truth-
functional (appendix A, claim 11), but can still be consistently understood as
conventional. A more direct response is that while it is not particularly clear
how truth by convention is a “different way of being true”, it is not more suspi-
cious than, say, a truth of physics: If a true physical theory ϑ entails sentence τ
but not true sentence %, one can say that unlike %, τ is true because of ϑ. And
if it is specifically CO (ϑ) that entails τ, one can say that τ is true because of the
analytic component of ϑ. In this sense, and compared to the truth of %, being
analytically true is a different way of being true, in the same way that being true
because of the laws of physics is.
Thus it seems that one of the central requirements of Carnap’s philosophy
of science, and indeed of logical empiricism in general, has been fulfilled: For
each theory, there is a way of distinguishing precisely between its analytic and
its synthetic component. Even better, there is an effective procedure that does so
6. Carnap (1956, 43) states that acceptance of higher order logic with a denumerably infinite
domain seems to be “sufficient to make sure that [the language] includes all of mathematics that
is needed in science”, but it is clear from his further expositions that he considers the acceptance
sufficient to define all of mathematics.
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automatically for all theories, simply based on the choice of the axiomatization
and the choice of the observational terms.
3 Winnie and Demopoulos on the Conditions of Ade-
quacy
For a consistent theory ϑ in a first order language without identity, Winnie
(1970, theorem 5) shows that beyond CO (ϑ), CO (ϑ)∧RT (ϑ) also fulfills the con-
ditions for the analytic component of ϑ (cf. Williams 1973, 404–8).7 The lack
of identity is necessary so that ϑ does not restrict the cardinality of its domain,
but as Demopoulos (2008, 376–77) points out, this can also be made an explicit
condition. Then Winnie’s result is easy to recover in higher order logic:
Claim 3. If ϑ does not restrict the cardinality of its domain, CO (ϑ)∧RT (ϑ) is an
adequate analytic component and RO (ϑ) is an adequate synthetic component of ϑ.
Proof. That RO (ϑ) fulfills conditions 2 and 3 of claim 1 follows from corollary 2.
Clearly, RO (ϑ) ∧ CO (ϑ) ∧ RT (ϑ) ϑ. Furthermore, if ϑ does not restrict the
cardinality of its domain,  R∅(ϑ) 
¬RO (ϑ) ∧ R∅(ϑ) ∨ RO (ϑ) ∧ R∅(ϑ) ¬RO (ϑ)∧R∅(ϑ)∨RO (ϑ) RO  ¬RO (ϑ)∧RT (ϑ)∨ϑ RO  RO (ϑ)→ ϑ∧
RT (ϑ)
 RO  CO (ϑ)∧RT (ϑ).
Winnie (1970, 294–96) and Demopoulos (2007, §v) consider this non-
uniqueness result something of a confirmation of the Quinean charge that the
distinction between analytic and synthetic sentences is arbitrary (cf. Quine 1951).
As a defense of Carnap’s approach, Winnie (1970, 296–97) and Demopoulos
(2007, §v) suggest an additional condition of adequacy for analytic components
that is based on
Definition 4. % is observationally vacuous in ϑ if and only if ϑ  % and for any
sentence τ with ϑ  τ and observational sentence ω, τ ∧% ω only if τ ω.
Winnie (1970, 296–97) points out that definition 4 is similar to but stronger
than the notion of observational conservativeness relative to an empty set in first
order logic (appendix A, definition 6, cf. Mates 1972, 200). He and Demopoulos
(2007, 259) further point out that an observationally vacuous sentence can never
contribute to the inference of an observational sentence. This, of course, is short-
hand for the claim that an observationally vacuous sentence can never contribute
to the inference of an observational sentence from a sentence entailed by ϑ.8 In
fact, % is observationally vacuous in ϑ if and only if, first, it is entailed by ϑ, and
7. RT (ϑ) = ∃X1 . . .Xmϑ(X1, . . . ,Xm ,T1, . . . ,Tn), see n. 3. To be precise, Winnie shows that any
theoretical sentence entailed by ϑ can be conjoined with CO (ϑ).
8. As Ayer (1946, 11–12) realized the hard way, almost any sentence % can contribute to the
inference of almost any observational sentence ω, namely in conjunction with % → ω when
%→ω 6ω (Lewis 1988).
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second, it is observationally conservative relative to every sentence entailed by ϑ.
This is a much stronger condition than, for example, observational conservative-
ness relative to ϑ, which would not strengthen Carnap’s conditions. For every
sentence entailed by ϑ is observationally conservative relative to ϑ. Hence it is
misleading when Demopoulos (2007, n. 12) calls observational vacuity a “spe-
cial case” of observational conservativeness. Indeed, observational vacuity is so
strong that one might suspect that no consequence of ϑ at all is observationally
vacuous in ϑ, since for any sentence % and observational sentence ω entailed by
ϑ, ϑ  %→ ω. Since %∧ (%→ ω)  ω, % therefore fails to be observationally
vacuous unless % → ω  ω, that is, ¬ω  %. In other words, a sentence % is
observationally vacuous only if it is entailed by ϑ and by the negation of every
observational sentence ω entailed by ϑ. Since RO (ϑ) is one such observational
sentence, % is observationally vacuous only if ¬RO (ϑ)  % and ϑ  %, that is,¬RO (ϑ)∨ϑ  %, or simply CO (ϑ)  %. Winnie (1970, corollary 12) also proves
the converse, so that the following holds:
Claim 4 (Winnie). % is observationally vacuous in ϑ if and only if CO (ϑ)  %.
Since Winnie demands as an additional condition of adequacy that the ana-
lytic component of ϑ be observationally vacuous in ϑ, he thereby shows that
only the Carnap sentence is an adequate explication of the analytic component
of ϑ and the Quinean charge of arbitrariness is met.
4 Against the Carnap Sentence
As already noted, the Carnap sentence of ϑ does not restrict the interpretation
of the observational terms at all if the Ramsey sentence is false and thus, by
claim 13 (appendix A), if ϑ asserts a single false observational sentence. There-
fore the Carnap sentence formalizes a very weak notion of the meaning given to
theoretical terms, and much stronger notions have been suggested. Lewis (1970,
432) suggests that a nearly realized theory interprets its theoretical terms by their
near-realizers, and he suggests that the notion of near-realizers can be explicated
as the interpretations of the theoretical terms of a true, slight weakening of the
theory. Unfortunately, Lewis leaves the notion of slight weakening unexplicated.
Bedard (1993, 508–9) avoids this problem by suggesting that if a theory is not
realized, its terms “partially denote” the things that realize its strongest true sub-
theories (whether slight weakenings or not), where subtheories of ϑ are entailed
by ϑ (503–5).
Like Lewis, Bedard relies on a semantics that is alien to the standard formal-
ism of higher order logic in that not all interpretations in which a theory ϑ
is true are possible realizations. Instead, the possible realizations are restricted
to those interpretations that are “natural” in some sense (cf. Schurz 2014, §5.8.3).
This restriction does not underlie the Ramsey and Carnap sentences: There, once
the observation terms are interpreted, the denotations of the theoretical terms
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are determined solely through their formal relations to the denotations of the ob-
servational terms as given by the theory ϑ. Therefore ϑ is realized if and only if
RO (ϑ) is true (appendix A, lemma 12). Bedard’s suggestion can be adapted to this
assumption so that the logically strongest sentence τ that is entailed by ϑ and
has a true Ramsey sentence provides the interpretation of the theoretical terms.
Of course, RO (τ) will typically not be logically true, while the Ramsey sentence
of ϑ’s analytic component has to be. Thus, in the adaptation of Bedard’s sugges-
tion, the analytic component of ϑ must be the strongest sentence entailed by ϑ
that has a logically true Ramsey sentence. Unfortunately, no general method is
known that would always produce such a sentence for any ϑ, but it is clear that
CO (ϑ)∧RT (ϑ) is closer to Bedard’s suggestion than CO (ϑ), because the former
is logically stronger than the latter.
Bedard’s and Carnap’s suggestions for the analytic component are as different
as suggestions with different assumptions about the basic formalism can be. The
question is which suggestion one should choose. There are a number of reasons
why in many situations CO (ϑ) is the wrong choice. One is the following: Take
any theory ϑ with theoretical content that is not logically true and does not
restrict the cardinality of its domain. Then, if the theory is extended in any
way so that its observational content increases, some of the theory’s analytic
implications will become non-analytic (see appendix A):
Claim 5. Let ϑ be such that RT (ϑ) is not logically true and has models of any
cardinality, and let τ be any sentence. Then CO (ϑ ∧ τ)  CO (ϑ) if and only if the
observational content of ϑ ∧τ is equivalent to that of ϑ.
The introduction of any sentence into a theory that increases the theory’s
observational content would thus render some previously analytic sentence non-
analytic. For instance, Carnap (1966, 238) states that as long as they avoid incon-
sistency, physicists “are free to add new correspondence rules”, which not nec-
essarily (or even typically) lead to an observationally equivalent theory.9 More
spectacularly, if ϑ is a theory about quarks and leptons, some of its analytic sen-
tences must be non-analytic in a theory ϑ′ ϑ ∧ %, where % is any sentence
with empirical content, for instance a claim about the number of letters in this
sentence. Or ϑ could be Newtonian mechanics and % the claim that there is a
planet that is closer to the sun than Mercury. In this sense, then, the Carnap
sentence is too holistic, since a minuscule change of a seemingly unrelated and
possibly completely observational aspect of a theory changes the meaning of its
theoretical terms. That specifically some previously analytic sentences can be-
come non-analytic also goes against Carnap’s intentions, since he thought that
by adding new correspondence rules, physicists are “increasing the amount of in-
terpretation specified for the theoretical terms” (238). As claim 5 shows, however,
9. How important such introductions of new correspondence rules are for Carnap’s account of
scientific theories can be seen from his discussion of the interplay of empirical and conventional
content in sequences of reduction sentences (Carnap 1936, 445–46).
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any correspondence rule that increases the observational content of a theory also
decreases the amount of interpretation specified for the theoretical terms.
The preceding considerations can also be phrased without reference to any
change of a theory: If one theory entails another and has additional empirical
content, then some of the analytic sentences of the logically stronger theory are,
counterintuitively, not analytic sentences of the weaker one. And it is not just
a small number of theoretical term that are affected. Two theories that differ
in their empirical content differ in almost every analytic sentence. This follows
from the basic logical form that every sentence entailed by the Carnap sentence
must have:
Claim 6. CO (ϑ)  α if and only if ϑ  α and α RO (ϑ)→ α.10
Proof. ‘⇒’: Since ϑ  CO (ϑ)  α, the first conjunct holds. Trivially, α 
RO (ϑ)→ α. Now assume CO (ϑ)  α. Then ¬RO (ϑ)∨ϑ  α and thus ¬RO (ϑ)  α,
so that RO (ϑ)→ α  ¬RO (ϑ)∨α  α.
‘⇐’: Since ϑ  α and RO (ϑ)→ α  α, CO (ϑ)  RO (ϑ)→ ϑ  RO (ϑ)→ α 
α.
Thus every analytic sentence of a theory is a conditional with that theory’s
Ramsey sentence as its antecedent. (Note that the Carnap sentence does not even
allow sufficient conditions ∀x[ϕ(x)→ T x] for theoretical terms T and proper
observational formulas ϕ, let alone explicit definitions.11) Hence, adding empir-
ical content to a theory weakens every of its analytic sentences, with the excep-
tion of those sentences that already happen to have the added empirical content
as an antecedent.
Two theories ϑ and τ with different empirical content thus share only those
analytic sentences α that are conditional on both RO (ϑ) and RO (τ). Specifically,
the only analytic sentences shared by two theories with incompatible empirical
content are logical truths:
Corollary 7. Let RO (ϑ)  ¬RO (τ), CO (ϑ)  α and CO (τ)  α. Then  α.
Proof. Assume CO (ϑ)  α. By claim 6, α RO (ϑ)→ α, and hence ¬α  RO (ϑ)∧¬α  RO (ϑ). Analogously, ¬α  RO (τ) so that ¬α  RO (τ)∧ RO (τ)  ⊥. Thus
 ¬⊥  α.
Thus, if ϑ is the conjunction of Newtonian mechanics and the claim that
there is a planet closer to the sun than mercury, while τ is the conjunction of
Newtonian mechanics and the claim that there is no such planet, then the two
theories have different concepts of mass, assuming ‘mass’ is a theoretical term. In
practice, corollary 7 states that even if the scientist wants to use the same concept
in competing theories, the Carnap sentence makes this impossible.
10. The result is consistent because RO (ϑ)→ [RO (ϑ)→ α] RO (ϑ)→ α.
11. Caulton (2012) was the first to show that the Carnap sentence does not allow explicit defini-
tions and argue that this is a severe problem.
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Another problem for the Carnap sentence stems from the use of mathematics
in scientific theories. As already noted, higher order logic itself does not contain
mathematical symbols, and so any axiom of mathematics must be explicitly in-
cluded in a theory (be it in the form of a definition of a mathematical symbol
from logical symbols or an axiom about the relation of not further defined math-
ematical symbols). Furthermore, mathematical symbols must be treated as theo-
retical, and so mathematical axioms must be theoretical sentences. The problem
is that then some mathematical axioms are not analytic according to the Carnap
sentence. The reason is a theorem by Winnie (1970, theorem 4), who shows that
in a first order language without identity, only tautological theoretical sentences
follow from the Carnap sentence of a consistent theory with observational con-
tent (cf. Williams 1973, theorem 5). In higher order logic, the result is a corollary
of claim 6 if the theoretical sentences do not restrict the cardinality of their do-
main (see appendix A):
Corollary 8. Let α be a theoretical sentence with models of any cardinality, and let
ϑ have observational content. Then CO (ϑ)  α only if  α.
Hence if only the Carnap sentence were an adequate analytic component,
mathematical axioms and theorems would be either cardinality claims or logical
truths. The axioms of group theory, for instance, do not restrict the cardinality
of their domain and would thus be logical truths, which they are not. In practice,
corollary 8 means that even if the scientist decides that, say, ∀x(T1x ↔ T2x)
should hold analytically in her theory ϑ (that is, T1 and T2 should be synonyms),
the Carnap sentence does not allow it. By claim 6, the strongest analytic claim
she can make is RO (ϑ)→∀x(T1x↔ T2x).
If the Carnap sentence is the wrong analytic component for some theories,
then observational vacuity, the condition of adequacy that (up to equivalence)
uniquely picks out the Carnap sentence as the only adequate analytic compo-
nent of a theory, must itself be inadequate. Therefore its motivation must be
flawed; and it is. Winnie and Demopoulos justify observational vacuity as a con-
dition of adequacy by pointing out that observationally vacuous sentences can-
not contribute to the inference of an observational sentence. But this shows at
best that the condition is not too inclusive. Demopoulos does not argue that all
observationally non-vacuous sentences do so contribute, and Winnie’s argument
to the effect (Winnie 1970, 296) fails. He argues that observational vacuity is to
observational consequences what logical vacuity is to consequences in any vo-
cabulary, and he points out that logical truths can be removed from any set of
premises without invalidating the inference of a sentence. Thus one would expect
that observationally vacuous sentences can be removed from any set of premises
without invalidating the inference of an observational sentence. But this is not
what definition 4 of observational vacuity states. It states that observational vacu-
ous sentences are entailed by ϑ and can be removed from any set of premises that
are entailed by ϑ without invalidating the inference of an observational sentence.
Thus observational vacuity is far from being directly analogous to logical truth.
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A more analogous concept would be for instance that of observational conser-
vativeness with respect to ϑ (definition 6, appendix A), which is fulfilled by a
sentence if it can be removed from any set of premises that contains ϑ without
invalidating the inference of an observational sentence. And since Carnap’s con-
ditions of adequacy already demand that the conjunction of the analytic and the
synthetic components be equivalent to ϑ, the analytic component is automati-
cally observationally conservative with respect to ϑ.
Thus observational vacuity has to be given up as a condition of adequacy
for the analytic component of theories. It might therefore seem that the Carnap
sentence has to be given up as well, and a new condition of adequacy must be
found that leads to a new method for determining the analytic component of
theories. But this is not the case. What has to be given up is the assumption that
there must be an automatic method of determining, for every ϑ, the analytic
component of ϑ. Specifically, Carnap’s conditions of adequacy suffice, and the
freedom they leave in the choice of the analytic component of a theory is justified.
Or so I argue next.
5 Against a Unique Adequate Analytic Component
Winnie and Demopoulos claim that without the demand for observational vacu-
ity of the analytic component of any theory ϑ, the analytic-synthetic dichotomy
is arbitrary. But this is a tendentious formulation, for one because at most the
analytic component of ϑ can be arbitrary, as its synthetic component is uniquely
determined up to equivalence by Carnap’s conditions of adequacy:
Claim 9. A sentence σ is an adequate synthetic component of ϑ if and only if σ 
RO (ϑ).
Proof. Assume that σ is an adequate synthetic component of ϑ. Then it is an
observational sentence, and hence σ RO (σ). By claim 1, it further holds that
RO (σ) RO (ϑ). Hence σ RO (ϑ). Given claim 1, the converse is immediate.
Winnie and Demopoulos’s claim of arbitrariness is also too strong because
the analytic component is far from being completely unrestricted.
Corollary 10. α is an adequate analytic component of ϑ if and only if  RO (α) and
ϑ  α  CO (ϑ).
Proof. By claims 1 and 9, α is adequate if and only if  RO (α) and RO (ϑ)∧α ϑ.
If the latter condition holds, then ϑ  α and RO (ϑ)∧α  ϑ, that is, α  RO (ϑ)→
ϑ. Conversely, if ϑ  α, then ϑ  RO (ϑ)∧α and if α  CO (ϑ), then RO (ϑ)∧α 
RO (ϑ)∧CO (ϑ)  ϑ.
Corollary 10 specifically entails that CO (ϑ) is the weakest possible analytic
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component of ϑ,12 and that an analytic component α can be logically at most as
strong as ϑ and must be weak enough so that  RO (α).
To see how benign the non-uniqueness of the analytic component of ϑ is,
consider what goes into a philosopher’s reconstruction of a scientist’s theory T
according to Carnap’s formalism. For one, the philosopher has to infer the scien-
tist’s intentions from her pronouncements about T and her use of T , and he has
to develop an axiomatization ϑ in higher order logic. If this is not possible, nei-
ther is the reconstruction in Carnap’s formalism. When ϑ has been developed or
while developing ϑ, the philosopher also has to find out which part of the vocab-
ulary the scientist intends to be observational. ϑ alone contains no information
about O at all. That the analytic component of ϑ is not unique given only ϑ
and O just means that to a certain extent the philosopher also has to rely on the
scientist’s intentions when determining the analytic component of ϑ. In other
words, the philosopher has to determine the analytic component in the same way
he has to determine the axiomatization and the observational terms: as part of
the process of the rational reconstruction of T . The conditions of adequacy only
provide a check of the rational reconstruction as a whole: If one has determined
ϑ, O , and the analytic component of ϑ, the conditions of adequacy have to be
met. Thus it could be the case that, for instance, a sentence clearly intended to be
analytic by the scientist forces the philosopher to treat some term as theoretical
rather than observational, or to axiomatize the theory in one way rather than
another.
In his defense of Winnie’s additional condition of adequacy, Demopoulos
(2008, 255–56, emphases removed) draws a bright line between the delineation of
O , which he calls the “first phase of Carnap’s reconstruction”, and the split of ϑ
into RO (ϑ) and CO (ϑ), which he calls the “second phase”. For Demopoulos, the
rational reconstruction of the theory T is complete with the axiomatization ϑ
and the delineation of O . The distinction between the analytic and the synthetic
component has to follow from the result of the rational reconstruction: “An ini-
tially plausible response (Maxwell 1963) holds that the arbitrariness is harmless if
it attaches only to the unreconstructed sentences of a science. But [ . . . ] the objec-
tion applies even to the second phase of Carnap’s proposed reconstruction, and
this appears to be a complete vindication of Quine” (Demopoulos 2008, v). But
Demopoulos’ bright line is itself arbitrary. The delineation of O is as dependent
on the intentions of the scientist as the delineation of the analytic component of
ϑ; both have to be rationally reconstructed. Indeed, this is what Maxwell (1963,
403–4) holds, for his description of the process of rational reconstruction is very
much like the one above:
For any reformation [i. e., rational reconstruction], it will be nec-
essary to presuppose—perhaps to stipulate—that [certain sentences]
are synthetic. [ . . . ] There will be a rule to the effect that the selec-
tion of sentences which are to be taken as A-true [analytically true]
12. This is shown for first order logic and sets of sentences by Williams (1973, 404).
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must be such that no conjunction of A-true sentences L-implies a
synthetic sentence. From this point on, as far as I can see, one must
proceed to a large extent by trial and error. As Carnap has pointed
out there is (certainly!) no decision procedure for A-truth. One will
try to select a set of sentences from [T ] which, if taken as A-true,
will “fix” to a satisfactory extent the meanings of the relevant expres-
sions.
Thus for Maxwell and (according to Maxwell) also for Carnap the rational re-
construction of T does not end with the axiomatization ϑ and the delineation
of O , but continues with the delineation of the analytic component of ϑ. The de-
mand that a conjunction of analytically true sentences must not logically entail a
synthetic sentence is a condition of adequacy on the relations between ϑ, its syn-
thetic sentences, and its analytic sentences. Carnap’s conditions of adequacy in
fact entail this condition: Since all analytic sentences are entailed by ϑ’s analytic
component, their conjunction is at most as strong as the analytic component it-
self and therefore, by Carnap’s conditions of adequacy, cannot entail a synthetic
sentence.
That Carnap’s conditions do not determine a unique analytic component of
a theory solely based on the delineation of the set of observational terms does
not mean that the analytic components of some theories have to be non-unique,
of course. For each theory, one can still choose exactly one analytic component.
It is only that one could also choose a different analytic component that would
also be adequate.
6 Przełe˛cki Reduction Pairs and Relativization Sen-
tences
If the Carnap sentence is not a theory’s only possible analytic component, what
other options are there? Bedard’s suggestion does not lead to a general solution:
While every theory has its Carnap sentence as unique weakest adequate analytic
component, not every theory has a unique strongest adequate analytic compo-
nent. For assume a theory
ϑ ∀x[ϕ(x)→ T x]∧∀x[ψ(x)→¬T x] (3)
consisting of two reduction sentences (Carnap 1936, 442), where ϕ and ψ are
observational formulas and T is a theoretical term. Then
∀x[ϕ(x)→ T x]∧∀x[ψ(x)∧¬ϕ(x)→ T x] (4a)
and
∀x[ϕ(x)∧¬ψ(x)→ T x]∧∀x[ψ(x)→ T x] (4b)
are both adequate analytic components, and neither entails the other.
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ϑ’s Carnap sentence
CO (ϑ) ∀x[ϕ(x)→¬ψ(x)]→∀x[ϕ(x)→ T x]∧∀x[ψ(x)→¬T x] (5)
(cf. Carnap 1963, 964–66) is the weakest adequate analytic component of ϑ and
thus clearly does not meet Bedard’s suggestion. Przełe˛cki (1969, §7.iii) suggests
the logically stronger sentence
∀x[ϕ(x)∧¬ψ(x)→ T x]∧∀x[ψ(x)∧¬ϕ(x)→¬T x] . (6)
I will call the two conjuncts (6) the ‘Przełe˛cki reduction pair for ϑ’. One advan-
tage of the Przełe˛cki reduction pair is that it retains the symmetry of the original
reduction sentences. More importantly, it is entailed by both of the stronger ade-
quate analytic components (4). Thus, having chosen Bedard’s over Carnap’s sug-
gestion, one cannot decide between the two stronger analytic components with-
out deferring to the intentions of the scientist, but one can rely on ϑ’s Przełe˛cki
reduction pair rather than ϑ’s Carnap sentence.
In a particularly intuitive way of arriving at the Przełe˛cki reduction pair, one
can consider it the relativization of the concepts of ϑ to the domain in which
RO (ϑ) is true. Even if RO (ϑ) = ∀x¬[ϕ(x) ∧ψ(x)] is false, there may be some
objects a in the domain for which ¬[ϕ(a)∧ψ(a)] is true. The relativization to
these objects, that is, the relativization ϑ(ξ ) of ϑ to ξ := λx¬[ϕ(x)∧ψ(x)] (cf.
Hodges 1993, 203)13 results in
ϑ(ξ ) ∀x [¬ϕ(x)∨¬ψ(x)]→ [ϕ(x)→ T x]
∧∀x [¬ϕ(x)∨¬ψ(x)]→ [ψ(x)→¬T x] , (7)
which is equivalent to the Przełe˛cki reduction pair. This consideration makes it
especially transparent that in contradistinction to CO (ϑ), ϑ’s Przełe˛cki reduction
pair allows for the relation T to have meaning even if RO (ϑ) turns out false.
The reasoning that led to the Przełe˛cki reduction pair suggests the following
generalization:
Definition 5. A relativization sentence for ϑ is any sentence ∃xξ (x)→ ϑ(ξ ) such
that ∀xξ (x) RO (ϑ).
The antecedent ∃xξ (x) of the relativization sentence ensures observational
conservativeness (see the proof of claim 15). Relativization sentences are in a
way analogous to Carnap sentences. For those structures in which a theory’s
Ramsey sentence is true, the Carnap sentence stipulates that the whole theory
is true, and for those structures in which the Ramsey sentence is false, the Car-
nap sentence stipulates nothing. Analogously, for sets of objects to which a the-
ory’s Ramsey sentence applies, relativization sentences stipulate that the theory
13. A relativization of a sentence to some one-place formula ξ restricts all quantifiers occurring
in the sentence to ξ .
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applies to them as well, and for sets of objects to which the Ramsey sentence
does not apply, they stipulate nothing. Unlike the Carnap sentence, however,
relativization sentences are not uniquely determined by a theory and its observa-
tional terms, since the only requirement for the relativizing formula ξ is that its
universal closure must be equivalent to the theory’s Ramsey sentence. And this
can be achieved in different ways, for even Carnap sentences are relativization
sentences. This can be shown by choosing RO (ϑ) as the relativizing formula;
since it contains no free variable, ∀xRO (ϑ) RO (ϑ) and, as is easily shown,∃xRO (ϑ)→ ϑ(RO (ϑ)) RO (ϑ)→ ϑ.
Relativization sentences are adequate analytic components of relational first
order theories (appendix A, claim 15), so that they can often be used instead
of Carnap sentences. Of course, relativization sentences are not mandatory ana-
lytic components either; they rather provide choices besides CO (ϑ) and CO (ϑ)∧
RT (ϑ).
7 Conclusion
Starting from an analysis of Carnap’s conditions of adequacy for the analytic
and the synthetic component of a theory, it has become clear that there is and
should be no automatic method for determining a theory’s analytic component
even when the theory is axiomatized and the observational vocabulary is delin-
eated. The delineation of the analytic sentences of a theory is as much part of its
rational reconstruction as the delineation of the theory’s observational vocabu-
lary. Therefore it is no problem that, unlike a theory’s synthetic component, a
theory’s analytic component is not uniquely determined by Carnap’s conditions
of adequacy. Specifically, a rational reconstruction does not have to identify a
theory’s Carnap sentence as its analytic component. Reduction sentences pro-
vide one particularly vivid illustration of the possibility of choosing a theory’s
analytic component differently, since Przełe˛cki reduction pairs and, more gener-
ally, relativization sentences turn out to be well-motivated, applicable, and hence
anything but inadequate.
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A Additional Definition and Proofs
Definition 6. A sentence % is first order observationally conservative with respect
to a sentence δ if and only if for any observational sentence ω it holds that
%∧δ ω only if δ ω.
Claim 5. Let ϑ be such that RT (ϑ) is not logically true and has models of any
cardinality, and let τ be any sentence. Then CO (ϑ ∧ τ)  CO (ϑ) if and only if the
observational content of ϑ ∧τ is equivalent to that of ϑ.
Proof. ‘⇐’: By corollary 14 (appendix A), the observational content of τ ∧ϑ is
equivalent to that of ϑ if and only if RO (ϑ) RO (ϑ ∧ τ). It is to be shown that
if CO (ϑ ∧ τ) holds, RO (ϑ) entails ϑ. Since RO (ϑ ∧ τ)→ ϑ ∧ τ holds and RO (ϑ)
entails by assumption RO (ϑ ∧τ), it also entails ϑ ∧τ and hence ϑ.
‘⇒’: If CO (ϑ∧τ)  CO (ϑ), then  CO (ϑ∧τ)→ CO (ϑ) and, by propositional
logic,  RO (ϑ)→ RO (ϑ∧τ)∨ϑ. Hence RO (ϑ)  RO (ϑ∧τ)∨ϑ and thus RO (ϑ) 
RO (ϑ ∧ τ) ∨ RT (ϑ). Since RT (ϑ) is not a tautology and does not restrict the
cardinality of its domain, any model for O of RO (ϑ) can be expanded such that
RT (ϑ) is false. Hence RO (ϑ∧τ) must be true in every model for O of RO (ϑ), so
that RO (ϑ)  RO (ϑ ∧τ) and thus RO (ϑ) RO (ϑ ∧τ)
Corollary 8. Let α be a theoretical sentence with models of any cardinality, and let
ϑ have observational content. Then CO (ϑ)  α only if  α.
Proof. By claim 6, CO (ϑ)  α only if RO (ϑ)→ α α and thus only if ¬RO (ϑ)∨
α α. Thus ¬RO (ϑ)  α. Since ¬RO (ϑ) and α do not share any vocabulary and
higher order logic has the Craig-interpolation property (Shapiro 1991, §6.6.2),
¬RO (ϑ)  α only if there is an interpolation sentence without non-logical sym-
bols that is entailed by ¬RO (ϑ) and that entails α. Since ϑ has observational
content, ¬RO (ϑ) is not logically false, and thus the interpolation sentence can-
not be logically false, so that it can at best restrict the cardinality of its domain.
But since α does not restrict the cardinality of its domain,  α.
Claim 11. According to the Carnap sentence, analyticity is not compositional.
Proof. It is to be shown that for some Carnap sentence, there are a sentence
schema Φ and two ways of completing the schema with sentences of the same
truth values and the same statuses regarding analyticity such that only in one
case the completion is analytically true. Let ϑ be O ∧T1, where O is an observa-
tion sentence and T1 a theoretical sentence whose Ramsey sentence is logically
true. Then CO (ϑ) O → (O ∧ T1) O → T1. Let Φ be ðX → Y ñ and the sen-
tences T1 and T2 have the same extensional truth value. None of the sentences O,
T1, and T2 is entailed by CO (ϑ) and hence none is analytically true (nor is any
analytically false). Thus O, T1, and T2 agree on their extensional truth values
and their analytic truth values. But while O→ T1 is analytically true, O→ T2 is
not.
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Lemma 12. Structure A for O can be expanded to a model of sentence ϑ if and only
if A  RO (ϑ).
Proof. A sentence ϑ is Ramseyfied by substituting every theoretical term Ti , 1≤
i ≤ n in ϑ by a variable Xi and existentially quantifying over each Xi , leading to∃X1 . . .Xnϑ[T1/X1, . . . ,Tn/Xn]. Define g : {Ti}1≤i≤n→{Xi}1≤i≤n ,Ti 7→Xi .
‘⇐’: Assume that A is a structure for O and A  RO (ϑ). Then there is a
satisfaction function ν mapping each variable Xi , 1 ≤ i ≤ n to an extension of
the same type over dom(A) such that A, ν  ϑ[T1/X1, . . . ,Tn/Xn]. Induction on
the complexity of formulas then shows that any extension of ν |{X1,...,Xn} ◦ g to all
theoretical terms can be used to expand A to a model of ϑ.
‘⇒’: Similar.
Claim 13. For any sentence ϑ, RO (ϑ) entails the same observational sentences as ϑ.
Proof. Since ϑ  RO (ϑ), ϑ entails all observational sentences entailed by RO (ϑ).
Conversely, assume that ϑ  ω, where ω is an observational sentence. If A is a
structure for O and A  RO (ϑ), then there is by lemma 12 an expansion B of A
such thatB  ϑ. By assumption,B ω. Sinceω is an observation sentence, the
reduct of B to O , A, is a model of ω. Thus RO (ϑ) ω.
Corollary 14. The observational content of ϑ is equivalent to RO (ϑ).
Proof. ϑ’s O-content is the set of observational sentences that it entails. Since
RO (ϑ) is an observational sentence that entails all observational sentences en-
tailed by ϑ (claim 13), RO (ϑ) is equivalent to the observational content of ϑ.
Claim 15. A relativization sentence for a relational first order sentence ϑ is an ade-
quate analytic component of ϑ.
Proof. By claims 1 and 9, it suffices to show that RO (ϑ)∧
∃xξ (x)→ ϑ(ξ ) ϑ
and  RO
∃xξ (x)→ ϑ(ξ ). The former is straightforward: RO (ϑ)∧ ∃xξ (x)→
ϑ(ξ )
 ∀xξ (x)∧ ∃xξ (x)→ ϑ(ξ ) ∀xξ (x)∧ϑ(ξ ) ϑ. For the latter, it has to
be shown that every structure A for O can be expanded to a model of ∃xξ (x)→
ϑ(ξ ) (lemma 12).
If A 6 ∃xξ (x), then any expansion B of A is such that B 6 ∃xξ (x), and
hence B  ∃xξ (x) → ϑ(ξ ). Thus assume that A  ∃xξ (x) and let C be the re-
striction A|ξ of A to ξ .14 Since ϑ is relational, A can be assumed to be relational
without loss of generality, and hence such a C exists. Trivially, A  ∀x[ξ (x)→
ξ (x)] [∀xξ (x)](ξ ), so that C  ∀xξ (x) RO (ϑ) by the relativization theo-
rem (Hodges 1993, 203). Hence there is an expansion B∗ of C such that B∗  ϑ
(lemma 12). Since C⊆A, there is an expansion B of A such that B∗ ⊆B. Since
B∗  ϑ and B∗ =B|ξ , B  ϑ(ξ ), again by the relativization theorem.
14. C = A|ξ if and only if C ⊆ A and dom(C) = {a : a satisfies ξ in A} (cf. Bell and Slomson
1974, 73).
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B Carnap on the Non-uniqueness of the Analytic Com-
ponent
Winnie (1970, 293) states that Carnap was aware that the Carnap sentence is
not the only possible analytic component of a theory given his conditions of
adequacy (definition 3). His evidence is the following remark by Carnap (1963,
965) on the Carnap sentence: “It may be that we wish to establish still further
sentences as AT -postulates [i. e., postulates for theoretical terms] in addition to
those formed from a theory TC in the way described. But we shall admit as AT -
postulates only sentences whose conjunction satisfies the condition [(c) of defi-
nition 3].” But Carnap here does not explicitly claim that the further sentences
can be seen as AT -postulates stemming from TC . The AT -postulates could also
be additional sentences that do not follow from TC .
Demopoulos (2007, 258, n. 11) claims that Carnap was not aware that there
are other adequate analytic components of a theory besides its Carnap sentence.
He states that this is “evident from his [Carnap’s] remarks” on the relation of
truth and analytic truth (Carnap 1963, 915), but there Carnap only states that
one can define analytic truth independently of truth, and thereafter prove that
every analytic truth is also true. This seems to be independent of the question
whether only the Carnap sentence fulfills Carnap’s conditions of adequacy.
According to Maxwell (1963, 404), “Carnap pointed out [that] there is (cer-
tainly!) no decision procedure for A-truth” (see the quote a the end of §5), which
speaks in favor of Winnie’s position. But the question whether Carnap thought
that the conditions in definition 3 determined a unique analytic component for
every theory is moot, because he did not consider the conditions necessary. For
Carnap (1963, 963–65) allowed analytic observational sentences that are not log-
ically true (called AO ), and thus there can be sentences whose Ramsey sentence
is not logically true, but that are nonetheless analytic (for instance any ω with
AO ω and 6ω). Carnap (1963, 965) rather takes the conditions to be sufficient
for showing that the Ramsey and Carnap sentences are adequate. After point-
ing out that the two sentences fulfill the conditions, he continues: “These results
show, in my opinion, that this method supplies an adequate explication for the
distinction between those postulates which represent factual relations between
completely given meaning, and those which merely represent meaning relations.”
And this does not mean there cannot be other results that would also show that
the Ramsey and the Carnap sentence are adequate.
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